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ABSTRACT 
 
Adaptive preference formation is the unconscious altering of our preferences in light of the 
options we have available. Jon Elster has argued that this is bad because it undermines our 
autonomy. I agree, but think that Elster’s explanation of why is lacking. So, I draw on a richer 
account of autonomy to give the following answer. Preferences formed through adaptation are 
characterised by covert influence (that is, explanations of which an agent herself is necessarily 
unaware), and covert influence undermines our autonomy because it undermines the extent to 
which an agent’s preferences are ones that she has decided upon for herself. This answer fills the 
lacuna in Elster’s argument. It also allows us to draw a principled distinction between adaptive 
preference formation and the closely related – but potentially autonomy-enhancing – 
phenomenon of character planning. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Adaptive preference formation – that is, the unconscious altering of our preferences in light of 
the options we have available – is often thought problematic, on various grounds. One 
suggestion – made most influentially by Jon Elster – is that adaptive preference formation is bad 
because it affects our autonomy. Elster’s argument to that end, however, is hampered by two 
problems. First, it is not clear what notion of autonomy he has in mind, nor indeed whether it is 
really autonomy (as opposed to rationality) that he cares about. For that reason, he is unable to 
account for the badness of adaptive preference formation Secondly, Elster is unable to offer a 
principled distinction between that phenomenon (which is supposed to be bad) and conscious 
character formation (which isn’t). In this paper, I offer a better account than Elster’s. By drawing 
on a richer account of autonomy, I show that adaptive preference formation is bad because it 
compromises the independence of our commitments: preferences formed through adaptation 
are characterised by covert influence (that is, explanations of which an agent herself is necessarily 
unaware). This also allows us to draw the necessary distinction with conscious character 
planning. While adaptive preference formation is always covert, character planning never is, and 
this explains why the latter can be positively supportive of our autonomy. 
 
1. ADAPTIVE PREFERENCE FORMATION 
 
Jon Elster has famously analysed various different mechanisms whereby the rationality of our 
preferences can be subverted.1 The most frequently discussed such mechanism is one that affects 
the formation or change of preferences, namely adaptive preference formation. Preferences that are 
formed in this way involve an element of adaptation to circumstances: our having we have the 
                                                           
1 J. Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (Cambridge, 1983). 
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preferences we do is explained by our beliefs about the unavailability of certain options, rather 
than (for example) the intrinsic qualities of the options we do have, and for which we have 
formed a preference. Elster illustrates the phenomenon by evoking Aesop and La Fontaine’s 
fable of the Fox and the Grapes. In that story, a fox sees some grapes hanging on a vine, but 
cannot reach them. So, the fox says ‘Those grapes are sour, anyway!’, and loses the preference 
for the grapes that he had before he realised that eating them was not a real option for him. His 
‘sour grapes’ reasoning is the mechanism whereby his preferences are adapted in response to the 
constraints placed on his option set.2 
Elster’s contention is that a preference is problematic when formed by such a 
mechanism. There are various reasons for this. One, for example, is that adaptive preferences 
subvert an agent’s rationality. More interestingly, though, Elster says that such cases pose a 
problem for an agent’s autonomy.3 If that’s right, then it shows how adaptive preference 
formation is a phenomenon with interest beyond a mere analysis of rationality. The notion of 
autonomy – disputed and unclear though it is – plays a role in a wide variety of moral and 
political arguments. If it turns out that adaptive preference formation is a mechanism which 
systematically undermines autonomy, then moral and political philosophers need to know why, 
and how to avoid it. 
 
2. ELSTER'S CONCEPTION OF AUTONOMY 
 
This potentially important normative payoff makes it frustrating that Elster’s arguments about 
the connection between adaptive preferences and autonomy are so unclear. This is for two 
reasons: first, it is not clear that Elster has in mind an ideal of autonomy (rather than just a 
conception of rationality), and secondly, even if we think that there is a distinct appeal to 
autonomy, it is unclear what autonomy amounts to on his view. 
Elster describes autonomy as ‘substantive rationality of desires ... being for desires what 
judgment is for belief’.4 Now, if Elster had given us a definition of substantive rationality, then 
the game would be up: by ‘autonomy’ he would just mean ‘whatever is required of desires (as 
opposed to beliefs) for them to fall under this broader category of substantively rational mental 
states’, and we would then be looking rather at an ideal of rationality than of autonomy as it is 
discussed by moral and political philosophers.  
As it happens, though, I think this is not the right interpretation, as is clear when we ask 
what is meant by ‘substantive rationality’. Elster contrasts it to ‘thin rationality’ – which requires 
only consistency in our mental states – but gives no general definition, beyond noting that our 
everyday use of the term ‘rational’ requires something that goes ‘beyond the excusively formal 
considerations’ of consistency.5 Rather than give such a definition, Elster goes through different 
types of mental state and explains what rationality in this ‘more substantive sense’ requires. For 
example, to be substantively rational, beliefs must be ‘grounded in the available evidence’, which 
                                                           
2 Elster, Sour Grapes, p. 109. 
3 Elster, Sour Grapes, p. 20. Others have made the same claim, e.g. John Christman in ‘Autonomy and Personal 
History’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991): 1-24; and David Zimmerman in ‘Making do: Troubling Stoic 
Tendencies in an Otherwise Compelling Theory of Autonomy’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2000): 25-54, esp. 
27-30. 
4 Elster, Sour Grapes, p. 30. 
5 Elster, Sour Grapes, p. 15. 
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is to say the output of a process of good epistemic judgement.6 Autonomy is the analogous 
criterion for desires. So, it rather looks as though Elster uses the term ‘substantive rationality’ as 
an umbrella term, designed to capture the various normative – but perhaps non-moral – 
standards by which we judge mental states. The standard that beliefs must live up to is that of 
formation through sound judgment on the basis of the available evidence. The standard that 
desires must live up to is that of autonomy. And so on. 
Let us assume that this is the right reading. This shows that the question of what 
autonomy consists in is still a live one. Elster may still want to link autonomy to rationality in 
some sense, but the crucial point is that a definition of autonomy should be prior to one of 
substantive rationality. Moreover, we might accept a proposed normative standard for desire-
formation without our interest in such a standard coming from a belief that it tells us anything 
interesting about rationality. 
Frustratingly, at precisely the point where we might want a definition, Elster admits 
defeat. He runs through various possibilities – implicit definition by pointing out ‘persons that 
apparently are in control over the processes whereby their desires are formed’, or explicit 
definitions like ‘autonomy desires ... have been deliberately chosen, acquired or modified’ – but 
rejects all as unsatisfactory for different reasons.7 So, he falls back on the more modest aim of 
running through some crucial cases in which autonomy is undermined through our desires being 
formed by questionable mechanisms, and hoping that that will help us discover what autonomy 
is. Indeed, he suggests that this is enough for his purposes, saying that 
 
In the present work, autonomy will have to be understood as a mere residual, as what is 
left after we have eliminated the desires that have been shaped by one of the mechanisms 
on the short list for irrational preference-formation.8 
 
Unfortunately for Elster, that can’t be satisfactory. We need a positive account of autonomy – 
not a ‘mere residual’ – if we are to know which mechanisms are unsatisfactory and why. 
Admittedly, the passage just quoted doesn’t imply that no such account is possible, nor indeed 
that we mightn’t find it by reflecting on the quality of desires left after various uncontroversially 
unsatisfactory mechanisms have been eliminated. But that means that everything hinges on the 
question of why adaptive preferences are bad, and our being able to have some grip on the 
answer before we know what autonomy is. So, we seem to be trapped in a circle. Elster can 
neither explain the badness of adaptive preferences nor help us discover what autonomy is by 
using the implicit definition by residue that he espouses. 
 
3. THE CONTRAST WITH CHARACTER FORMATION 
 
In his discussion of adaptive preferences, Elster distinguishes the sour grapes mechanism with 
which he is particularly concerned from various related phenomena: counteradaptive 
preferences, precommitment, addiction and so on.9 For the most part these are diagnosed as 
                                                           
6 Elster, Sour Grapes, pp. 15-17. 
7 Elster, Sour Grapes, pp. 21-22. 
8 Elster, Sour Grapes, p. 24. 
9 Elster, Sour Grapes, pp. 111-24. 
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being problematic, but not necessarily for the same reason as adaptive preferences. One 
phenomenon he mentions is not intended to be problematic, and this is conscious character 
planning – that is, being aware of the limitations in one’s options and moulding one’s projects 
and inclinations so as to settle on preferences which one can fulfil.10. Such planning, Elster says, 
is a good thing from the point of view of autonomy; or at any rate, if it is bad, it's not bad for the 
same reasons as adaptive preference formation. 
The problem is that, in some respects, character planning and adaptive preference 
formation look extremely similar. Both involve an agent’s preferences changing (or being formed 
by) their beliefs about the limitations of their option sets. So, if we want to give different moral 
appraisals of the two phenomena, we must be able to point to a sharp and principled distinction 
between them. Elster fails to do this, because he characterises the difference between character 
planning and adaptive preference formation in several non co-extensive ways.  
Some of these are plainly intended to be descriptive, rather than definitive. So, for 
example, Elster says that adaptive preference formation tends to ‘overshoot’ what is determined 
by one’s possibilities (meaning that preferences are modified more than is strictly required), 
whereas character planning can ‘shape one’s wants so as to coincide exactly with ... one’s 
possibilities’; and  notes that the former usually involves downgrading inaccessible options and 
the latter involves upgrading accessible ones.11 It would seem uncharitable, though, to read Elster 
as saying that these contrasts are what the distinction itself consists in, although others who have 
worried about adaptive preference formation do seem guilty of this error.12 Elster does say 
enough, though, for us to identify three different proposals for drawing the crucial distinction. 
As we will see in §6, I think that on each reading he identifies something crucial, but – lacking as 
he does the unifying conception of autonomy I will introduce in §4 – each reading proves 
unsatisfactory.13 
 
A: Causal vs consciously engineered 
 
In one place, Elster characterises adaptive preference formation as a ‘purely causal process’ and 
contrasts it with character planning as ‘engineered by conscious strategies of liberation’.14 In 
another paper, Elster says that the problematic feature of adaptive preference formation is that 
‘the source of the preference change is not in the person’, whereas, by implication, the source of 
                                                           
10 Elster, Sour Grapes, pp. 117-19. 
11 Elster, Sour Grapes,  pp. 118-19. 
12 e.g. M. Rickard, ‘Sour-grapes, Rational Desires and Objective Consequentialism’, Philosophical Studies 80 (199): 279-
303, at 284. 
13 Others besides Elster have tried to characterise the distinction. For the most part their distinctions tend to map 
onto one or other of the proposals for interpreting Elster that I discuss here, so I do not mention them separately. 
One exception is Luc Bovens, who says that the two types of phenomenon differ differ in respect of the semantic 
content of the preferences we end up with: adaptive preference formation involves adjusting one’s preference for 
tokens without engaging in reasoning about the desirability of types, whereas ‘a typical case of character planning is the 
more involved project in which I can adjust my reasons for the ranking at hand’. See L. Bovens ‘Sour Grapes and 
Character Planning’, The Journal of Philosophy 89 (1992): 57-78, at 74. I do not consider Bovens’s proposal here, for 
the same reasons as those given by Zimmerman, who complains that its focus on the content of preferences is 
misplaced, and leads Bovens to ignore some important variants of adaptive preference formation (see his ‘Sour 
grapes, self-abnegation and character building’, The Monist 86 (2003): 220-41, at 228-35. 
14 Elster, Sour Grapes, p.  117. 
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preference change in the case of character planning is.15 Such statements might imply that the 
distinction maps roughly onto a causal/non-causal divide. However, this is implausible. The 
presence or absence of causation can hardly be what is at issue. Unless Elster wants to defend 
the view that character planning allows us to slip the shackles of physical determinism (a 
controversial metaphysical thesis for which he offers no argument), any sense in which adaptive 
preference formation is ‘purely causal’ must also be one in which character planning is too.16 
 
B: Unconscious vs conscious 
 
Perhaps the relevant feature of character planning is that it is conscious. If that is so, Elster’s 
reference to a ‘purely causal process’ might be read as an oblique claim that adaptive preference 
formation is typically unconscious – in his words it takes place ‘behind the back of the agent 
concerned’.17 This seems more plausible than the causal/non-causal contrast. However, it can’t 
be what Elster is after either. Recall that we need a distinction which can ground Elster’s claim 
that adaptive preference formation is bad and character formation is not. But there are many 
processes of preference formation that are unconscious – indeed, we might think that most 
preferences are formed unconsciously, with conscious character planning being something of a 
rarity. The desire for food is not normally induced through conscious hunger-creation. A 
preference for sleep is only rarely something which someone has consciously to cultivate at the 
end of the day. It would be a very austere notion of autonomy indeed which judged that eating 
and sleeping were, under almost all circumstances, problematic from the point of view of 
autonomy. That would follow, though, from thinking that it is the mere fact of adaptive 
preference formation being unconscious that distinguished it from morally unproblematic character 
planning. 
 
C: Drives versus meta-preferences 
Elster claims that the distinction between the two phenomena is ‘the difference between 
preferences being shaped by drives or by meta-preferences.’18 Elster must mean one of two 
things by ‘drives’: either he means ‘first-order’ (as opposed to higher-order, or ‘meta-’) 
preferences, or he means some rank of preferences which is lower than what we usually refer to 
as ‘first-order’. It doesn’t really matter which. The crucial point is that on this proposal, the 
difference between character planning and adaptive preference formation is that the latter 
involves lower-order preferences being shaped by higher-order ones, and the former does not. 
This is a different distinction to both A and B. ‘Drives’ and ‘meta-preferences’ are 
presumably both mental states, and so whatever our view on the role of causation in the mental 
we will end up classifying them on the same side of the causal/non-causal divide. Moreover, 
                                                           
15 Elster, Sour Grapes, pp. 109-10. 
16 For further discussion of Elster's distinction construed this way, see Tore Sandven in  ‘Intentional action and pure 
causality: A critical discussion of some central conceptual distinctions in the work of Jon Elster’, Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences 25 (1995): 286-317; ‘Autonomy, adaptation, and rationality – a critical discussion of Jon Elster’s 
concept of “sour grapes” Part I’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 29 (1999): 3-31; and ‘Autonomy, adaptation, and 
rationality – a critical discussion of Jon Elster’s concept of “sour grapes” Part II’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 29 
(1999): 173-205. 
17 Elster, Sour Grapes, p. 117. See also Zimmerman 'Sour grapes', 221. 
18 Elster, Sour Grapes, p. 117. 
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there is no reason to think that the process by which our preferences are shaped by meta-
preferences is necessarily conscious, nor either the converse. For a counterexample to the 
former, consider Marilyn Friedman’s case of a oppressed spouse whose higher-order preference 
to have fully obedient desires leads to her unconsciously suppressing her first-order preference 
not to wash the dishes.19 For a counterexample to the latter, imagine someone who is perpetually 
and powerfully hungry, and so consciously cultivates preferences for cheap victuals so that she 
might get as much food as possible. 
In what follows, I analyse proposal C in much more detail than either A or B. This is 
because at first sight it looks much like a much more promising way of construing the distinction 
between adaptive preference formation and character planning. For one thing, it is clear, 
assuming that one thinks that the hierarchical model of preferences – originally proposed by 
Harry Frankfurt – is correct.20 For another, it suggests that Elster might be able to appeal, in 
responding to my worries in §2, to the influential conception of autonomy which stems from 
Frankfurt’s model, on which autonomy consists in higher-order endorsement of lower-order 
preferences. Gerald Dworkin defines it thus: 
 
Autonomy is conceived of as a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon 
their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept or 
attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences and values.21 
 
Now, if he wanted to co-opt Dworkin model of autonomy to explain the difference between 
adaptive preference formation and character planning, Elster would needs to modify things 
somewhat. For one thing, he would have to say that the former is not bad just because it involves 
lower-order preferences influencing each other – there doesn’t seem anything wrong with that, 
and such processes are on Dworkin’s account neutral vis-à-vis autonomy. Rather, he would have 
to say that adaptive preference formation is bad because it involves one’s first-order preferences 
having the shape they do despite the fact that, if we reflected on them in light of our second-
order preferences, we would repudiate them.  
I think that using a theory of autonomy to explain the distinction between the two 
phenomena is the right approach, as I show in §6. However, Dworkin’s conception of autonomy 
will not do the work that Elster needs it to do, and for that reason the proposal based on higher-
order endorsement fails. 
The problem for Elster here is this. The motivation and content for the distinction 
between adaptive preference formation and character planning now comes from Dworkin’s 
conception of autonomy. So, Elster’s account stands or falls with Dworkin’s, and is vulnerable to 
the significant criticism that the latter has attracted. For example, Gary Watson and Irving 
Thalberg influentially complain that the crucial notion of identification is sufficiently vague to 
                                                           
19 M. Friedman ‘Autonomy and the split-level self’, Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1986): 19-35. 
20 H. Frankfurt ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 5-20. 
21 G. Dworkin The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge 1988): p. 20. Dworkin’s book was published after 
Elster’s, so the latter can’t have had in mind the precise formulation just quoted. However, Dworkin expressed a 
broadly similar idea earlier, e.g. in ‘Autonomy and Behaviour Control’, Hastings Centre Report 6 (1976): 23-28; and 
‘The Concept of Autonomy’, in R. Haller ed. Science and Ethics. (Amsterdam, 1981):  pp. 203-13.  
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make one sceptical about the whole theory.22 I shall not here discuss most criticisms in detail, 
since their main relevance is to show that Elster, if he is to rely on Dworkin’s theory of 
autonomy, carries a significant burden of proof which is as yet undischarged. That is enough to 
motivate someone who sympathises with Elster to prefer the account I sketch in the next few 
sections. However, one line of attack is relevant, since it both threatens Elster’s moral assessment 
of the distinction between adaptive preference formation and character planning, and motivates 
my preferring the conception of autonomy I set out in §§4-5. 
Above, I mentioned a powerful point made by Marilyn Friedman. Friedman suggests that 
there are cases of conflict between higher- and lower-order preferences where, contrary to 
Dworkin’s theory, an individual is more autonomous if she acts on the latter and attempts to 
revise the former.23 For example, she asks us to consider a woman who has been brought up to 
desire some oppressive level of obedience to her husband. Such an individual might have a 
strong first-order preference not to wash the dishes, and a strong higher-order preference not to 
have such disobedient preferences. From the point of view of autonomy, Friedman points out 
that it is not at all clear that the first-order preferences should be overridden. Indeed, our 
intuitions rather favour the opposite, and insofar as Dworkin must advocate the first course, his 
theory is implausible. 
In response to criticisms like Friedman’s, the debate over Dworkin’s conception has 
become somewhat stuck in a baroque fugue between critics (who propose cases as 
counterexamples to the conception) and proponents (who offer small modifications to address 
each counterexample as it arrives). The debate is inconclusive, and its details need not concern us 
here.24 Two points only need to be made.  
The first is that Friedman’s example hinges on worries about the provenance of people’s 
higher-order attitudes. Our obedient housewife’s higher-order desire to be obedient is 
questionable because we think she has been brainwashed into it. Merely being higher-order 
doesn’t guarantee that it is unproblematic from the point of view of autonomy. Indeed, we can 
easily give a more detailed description of Friedman’s case so that the higher-order preference is 
itself the result of what looks like adaptive preference formation. Perhaps the reason that the 
housewife has such a strong preference to have only obedient preferences is as a reaction to the 
limited options available for an independent-minded woman in a chauvinistic society. That 
seems eminently possible – or at any rate, whether it is is a matter for psychological investigation, 
not analytic reflection. However, it is ruled out analytically by the Dworkin-inspired way of 
capturing the distinction between adaptive preference-formation and character planning: the 
process where lower-order preferences are brought into line with higher-order ones is by 
definition the latter and not the former. I assume that this is sufficiently implausible as to rule 
out the initially promising proposal that we understand Elster’s distinction as piggybacking on 
Dworkin’s hierarchical account of autonomy. 
The second point is broader, and returns to the issue I first raised in §2. We turned to 
Dworkin to give us a suitable conception of autonomy that could be used to underwrite both 
                                                           
22 G. Watson, 'Free Agency’, Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975): 205-20; I. Thalberg ‘Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree 
Action’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1978): 211-26. 
23 Friedman, ‘Autonomy and the split-level self’. 
24 There are more such arguments in Friedman ‘Autonomy and the split-level self’; Thalberg ‘Hierarchical Analyses’, 
and M. Oshana ‘How much should we value autonomy?’, Social Philosophy and Policy 20 (2) (2003): 99-126. Some 
defences can be found in M. Bratman ‘Autonomy and Hierarchy’, Social Philosophy and Policy 20 (2) (2003): 156-76. 
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Elster’s claims about the badness of adaptive preference formation and also his distinction 
between that phenomenon and character formation. The fact that Dworkin’s conception has 
become enmired in such a fruitless debate reveals, I think, a deeper worry about that way of 
understanding autonomy. Even if we can provide endless ad hoc modifications in response to 
cases like Friedman’s, we can still ask: Why should we think it valuable for people to have their 
hierarchy of attitudes arranged in the particular way he describes? Why should higher-order 
attitudes be authoritative? Insofar as the hierarchical theory leaves such questions open, it is 
inconclusive, and seems most likely itself tacitly to rely on a different conception of autonomy 
which is actually doing the normative work. Since uncovering such a conception will help rescue 
Elster as well, I now turn to setting out my positive account.  
 
4. AUTONOMY REDUX 
 
In this section, I set out what I take to be a better conception of autonomy. This serves two 
ends. First, it offers a charitable addition to Elster’s own account. If, as I suggested in §2, we 
should interpret him as saying that ‘autonomy’ refers to whatever substantive standard against 
which our preferences should be assessed, then what follows offers such a standard which is 
consistent with the schematic theory that he has laid out. Secondly, supplementing Elster’s view 
with the following theory of autonomy allows us to address the two problems for Elster that I 
have been discussing: first, by giving a clear account of the badness of adaptive preference 
formation, and secondly by showing how we can reconstruct from the apparently diverse 
proposals in §3 a unified and principled distinction can be drawn between that phenomenon and 
character planning. 
The conception of autonomy I propose is broadly the same as what Joseph Raz has in 
mind when he describes autonomy as an ‘ideal of self-creation’, and speaks of an agent as ‘part 
author of his life’.25 These metaphors are evocative, but somewhat vague. Elsewhere, I have 
suggested the following formulation: 
 
Autonomy consists in deciding for oneself what is valuable, and living one’s life in 
accordance with that decision.26 
 
This seems to me the most defensible of the various conceptions of autonomy in the 
intellectual marketplace. As it stands, the definition raises a number of questions, though. Some 
are hermeneutical (how far would Raz say that this identifies the same idea as his?). Others are 
justificatory (should we think that autonomy, so conceived, is valuable?). I shall address neither 
set of questions seriously here, though I take my conclusions in this paper to be relevant to both. 
The success of my conception in dealing with the problems I have identified in Elster should 
serve both as a weak recommendation for conceiving of autonomy in the way that I do, and as a 
defence against the arguments in §§2-3 insofar as they might be mobilised as objections to a 
political theory committed to autonomy as an ideal. A third set of questions concern the details 
                                                           
25 J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, 1986): p. 370. Similar notions of autonomy can be found in T. Hurka, 
Perfectionism (Oxford, 1993) at p. 148; and S. Wall Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint (Cambridge, 1998), at p. 128. 
26  B. Colburn, Autonomy and Liberalism (New York, 2010): p. 19. 
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of my conception of autonomy: for example, what does ‘deciding for oneself’ mean? I address 
these questions in the remainder of this section.  
Before doing so, I note that a conception of autonomy like this can plug the gap I noted 
at the conclusion of the previous section, by motivating the connection between higher-order 
reflection and autonomy. Different theorists might construe this connection in different ways. 
Perhaps high-order reflection might be deemed both necessary and sufficient for self-authorship, 
in which case the two conceptions of autonomy end up extensionally equivalent, and the 
reference to self-authorship merely serves to motivate taking this as an ideal. On the other hand, 
one might think higher-order reflection merely necessary but not sufficient, or (as the tenor of my 
discussion above perhaps implies) neither, though it is generally supportive of self-authorship. 
On those views, autonomy on Dworkin’s conception will turn out to be constitutively, or 
instrumentally, or heuristically valuable with respect to autonomy on my conception. In any case, 
though, such dependence would add weight to the thought that mine is a more fundamental 
ideal than those of rival theorists of autonomy. 
 To recap: autonomy consists in deciding for oneself what is valuable, and living one’s life 
in accordance with that decision. That has two principal components. The latter deals with 
success in pursuing one’s aims, and is not relevant to our present discussion. The former 
concerns the conditions those aims must meet if their pursuit is to count towards our autonomy. 
Now, the word ‘decide’ is ambiguous in ordinary usage. It can refer to a choice by an agent, or to 
some sort of epistemic judgment. These are usually distinguished by the uses of the locutions 
‘decided to’ and ‘decided that’, respectively. I do not intend to presuppose either usage when I 
say that autonomy involves people ‘deciding for themselves’ what is valuable. Indeed, the double 
meaning seems appropriate: some individuals will choose to pursue some project and thereby 
make its fulfilment valuable, and some individuals will reflect and decide that such-and-such an 
end is valuable. The crucial thing is that an agent decides for herself (in the sense relevant to 
autonomy) to the extent that the following two conditions hold: 
• Endorsement – she has a disposition such that if she reflects (or were to reflect) upon 
what putative values she ought to pursue in her life, she judges (or would judge) of some 
such things that they are valuable. 
• Independence – She is in a state where her reflection is, or would be if it took place, 
free from factors which limit the extent to which we can say that she is deciding for 
herself. 
The Endorsement Condition requires the presence only of a disposition. So, an agent can satisfy 
it without necessarily going through the process of consciously reflecting upon her values: it may 
just be that were she so to reflect, in her present circumstances, she would come to the judgement 
described. This focus on a disposition is a way of making concrete the attractive notion that what 
matters is not the act of occurrent reflection itself, but rather the relationship that such reflection 
reveals between an agent and the commitments which shape her life. One can endorse values 
either explicitly or implicitly, but that crucial relationship obtains in both cases. So, on my theory, 
one need not have consciously reflected upon whether one really takes a given thing to be 
valuable to be autonomous in its pursuit: instead, one's behaviour might indicate a tacit 
endorsement of that value. So, consider someone who is a talented geneticist and pianist, and 
who eventually chooses to pursue the cure for cancer rather than the world of concert 
performance. It may well be that she never consciously weighs up two different putative values – 
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‘curing cancer’ and ‘producing great music’ – and makes an explicit judgment about which one 
she believes she should pursue. Nevertheless, we might think that her pursuing the cure for 
cancer is an implicit endorsement of curing cancer as a valuable pursuit: she was aware of what 
alternatives she had, and might have explained, if we asked her to, why she took that course 
rather than pursuing the musical life instead. Phrasing the Endorsement Condition in terms of 
dispositions allows us to say that an implicit endorsement like this also counts as deciding for 
oneself what is valuable. 
The Independence Condition is a good deal vaguer than its companion: it requires that 
an agent be in a position such that her reflection is (if it takes place) our would be (if it were to 
take place) free from factors which undermine the extent to which we can say that she is 
deciding for herself. This captures something important, but gives us little help if we want a general 
account of when someone’s independence is undermined. One way we might try to make things 
clearer is to return to Dworkin, who also insists on the importance of procedural independence 
(as he puts it). Dworkin admits that he can give no general account himself, but he does at least 
give a succinct explanation of what sort of account is needed, which can serve as our starting 
point: 
 
Spelling out the condition of procedural independence involves distinguishing those ways 
of influencing people’s reflective and critical faculties which subvert them from those 
which promote and improve them. It involves distinguish those influences such as 
hypnotic suggestion, manipulative coercive persuasion, subliminal influence, and so forth, 
and doing so in a non ad hoc fashion.27 
 
As Dworkin notes, independence in the relevant sense does not mean the absence of any 
influences on our decisions about what is valuable. Only those who are hostile to a concern for 
autonomy would set up such a straw man. Rather, when we say that someone’s commitments are 
independent, we mean that they are free of a certain sort of influence, which is instantiated in the 
intuitive instances listed above. The challenge that Dworkin lays down is therefore to identify 
this baleful influence. 
 
5. INDEPENDENCE AND COVERT INFLUENCE 
 
In what follows, I give a partial answer to Dworkin’s challenge, by proposing a necessary 
condition for independence, which centres on the notion of covert influence. Someone’s 
commitments (or values, or judgements, or preferences – for present purposes it doesn’t really 
matter which) are covertly influenced when the explanation for those commitments is something 
that is necessarily hidden from them, in the sense that it would not be the explanation for their 
commitment if it weren’t hidden. And when they are covertly influenced, they lack 
independence.28 
                                                           
27 Dworkin, Theory and Practice of Autonomy: p. 18. 
28 There is, of course, a further question of whether the lack of covert influence is not merely necessary, but also 
sufficient for independence. Since an answer to that question is not needed for my purposes here, I do not seek to 
address it. 
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This, I suggest, is the shared factor which is at work in the various cases that Dworkin 
lists. Hypnotic suggestion and subliminal influence both work necessarily through bypassing 
someone’s conscious deliberative processes. So, to use an example borrowed from Roger Crisp, 
imagine a case of subliminal advertising by a cinema. Single-frame adverts for ice-cream are 
flashed on screen during the showing of a film, as a result of which people in the audience form 
a desire to eat ice-cream during the interval. In such cases, the explanation for their preference 
for ice-cream is covert: they cannot be aware of it. It seems likely that from their point of view 
this preference is based on a proper appreciation of the virtues of ice-cream. At any rate, if their 
preference is genuine they won’t think that the only reason they have for it is that single-frame 
images of ice-cream have been interspersed with the film that they have been watching. 
Nevertheless, as detached observers we can see that this is exactly what has happened. They 
entered the screening with no preference for ice-cream, and left with a marked preference and 
intention to buy, and the reason for this is the subliminal technique that has been applied to 
them.29 So, the explanation for their preference is necessarily hidden from them – if it weren’t, it 
wouldn’t be the right explanation. 
As Crisp points out, that is not to say that the technique itself is necessarily hidden. One 
can be informed that one has been the subject of subliminal messaging. One can even be so 
informed without that causing the artificially induced desires to lapse. The point is just that when 
someone is made aware of that, the explanation for their preference must change. We no longer 
say just that they desire ice-cream because the cinema management induced the desire in them. 
Depending on their reaction, we would say either that they realize that the desire was induced 
but can adduce other independent reasons for their eating ice-cream being something they want 
to do, or that they repudiate that desire (in which case, as Crisp notes, the ostensible innocent 
desire for ice-cream has become the sort of unwanted craving which is a paradigmatic threat to 
autonomy).30 The point is that subliminal messaging is covert insofar as it is the explanation of our 
sincerely held preferences.  
Subliminal advertising and hypnotic suggestion are somewhat spectacular example cases. 
Crisp discusses various more mundane techniques used by advertisers which he thinks are 
damaging to a consumer’s autonomy. In general, the effective techniques of persuasive 
advertising are effective precisely because they play on the subconscious, and therefore create 
distance between the explanation that a consumer adduces for their preference and the 
explanation that an impartial observer would be inclined to give. ‘When I buy Pongo Peach 
[cosmetics],’ Crisp says, ‘I may claim that I want to look good. In reality, I buy it owing to the 
link made by persuasive advertising between my unconscious desire for adventure and the 
cosmetic in question’.31 Moreover, we can see that the mechanism is not merely hidden, but 
covert: the mechanism must be hidden because it wouldn’t work otherwise. To make the point, 
Crisp asks: would you buy Pongo Peach products if they advertised it by saying ‘Do you have a 
sense of adventure? Then use this brand of cosmetics’. When the attempt to link Pongo Peach 
with the subconscious desire for adventure is made explicit, it is also made risible, and hence 
uneffective.32 
                                                           
29 R. Crisp, ‘Persuasive Advertising, Autonomy, and the Creation of Desire’, Journal of Business Ethics 6 (1987): 413-18. 
30 Crisp, ‘Persuasive Advertising’: 414-5. 
31 Crisp, ‘Persuasive Advertising’: 415. 
32 Crisp, ‘Persuasive Advertising’: 416. We can assume that the unconscious link is indeed risible, and hence won’t 
stand up to scrutiny. 
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I don’t mean to argue here in favour of Crisp’s claim that such mechanisms are endemic 
in advertising (though as it happens I think it’s true). The point here is just that Crisp identifies 
the right problem: the influence involved – and hence the explanation for agents’ commitments 
– is covert, in the sense described above. 
Covert influence on an agent’s commitments is bad for autonomy, because it undermines 
the extent to which we can say she herself is deciding on what is valuable. To illustrate the point, 
consider the difference between first- and third-person explanations for a person’s 
commitments. Usually, the former will feature in the latter. If someone asks me why I am 
committed to playing a musical instrument, I might say something like ‘Because I devoted myself 
to learning the harp several years ago, and it is important to me to fulfil that ambition’, or 
‘Because playing the harp well is valuable’. In most cases, someone else trying to explain my 
commitment will echo these answers: ‘It is because he wants to fulfil his ambition to succeed in 
his chosen hobby’, or ‘It is because he believes that playing the harp well is valuable’. And that is 
as it should be: when thinking about why someone has the commitments they do, their own 
perspective on what is valuable and their motivations has some sort of authority. By contrast, 
there are cases in which the first-person explanation features in none of the third-person 
explanations because it is irrelevant. If someone is brainwashed into joining a cult, the third-
person explanation for her commitment will not take at face value her rapturous account of 
seeing the light. If she is subliminally influenced into wanting ice-cream, then the third-person 
explanation will disregard her attempts at rationalising her sudden longing for raspberry ripple. 
In such cases, the ‘real’ reason for her commitments is opaque from her first-person point of 
view. Because something else (about which she cannot know) explains her commitments, we 
can’t say that she is deciding for herself. So, her autonomy is compromised, because she fails the 
Independence Condition in respect of these commitments. 
To recap: the proposal is that autonomy is undermined when our commitments have 
covert explanations. Focussing on covert explanations, as opposed to ones of which we’re merely 
unaware or unconscious, is important for three reasons.  
The first is that it best captures the intuitive thought that the problem is not just that the 
explanation for a commitment happens not to have occurred to an agent, but rather that it could 
not occur to them. The second is that it echoes the reasons given above for phrasing the 
Endorsement Condition in terms of a disposition to endorse, rather than requiring occurrent 
reflection. As I said there, requiring occurrent reflection would lead to an implausible and narrow 
conception of autonomy, fetishising rational reflection (rather than regarding it as a useful 
indication of what is actually important) and excluding various obviously autonomous lives, like 
that of the devoted but unreflective cancer scientist. If the Independence Condition required that 
we be aware of all explanations for our commitments, then it would have a similar effect. Picking 
out only covertly explained commitments as problematic avoids this, and hence harmonizes with 
the reasons given above for preferring to think about autonomy in the way that I proposed.  
The third reason for focussing on covert influence is that it allows me to sidestep the 
criticisms I levelled against Elster in §3B. There, I noted that identifying the distinction between 
adaptive preference formation and character planning would have various implausible 
consequences, chiefly because it would have to condemn as problematic any preference not 
conscious formed. Insisting that the problem is not with unconsciousness per se but with 
necessary unconsciousness means that I am not vulnerable to the same problem. And it also allows 
us to pay due heed to the impression that – the aforementioned criticisms notwithstanding – 
13 
 
Elster had put his finger on something important when he noted that there’s something 
troubling about our commitments being formed behind our backs. 
 
6. COVERT INFLUENCE AND ADAPTIVE PREFERENCE FORMATION 
 
In the previous section, I set out a conception of autonomy on which the notion of covert 
influence is central. If our commitments have covert explanations – that is, explanations of 
which we necessarily are not aware – then those commitments lack independence, and lack of 
independence undermines autonomy. It remains to show how this way of thinking about 
autonomy allows us to offer solutions to the two problems I set out with Elster’s theory: how to 
account for the badness of adaptive preference formation, and how to distinguish between that 
phenomenon and character planning. 
 First, recall that Elster’s attempt to explain the badness of adaptive preference formation 
failed. To motivate the thought that there is something wrong with adaptive preference 
formation, we needed a prior notion of autonomy. Not only did Elster fail to give us an explicit 
definition, the implicit definition – that autonomy is what is left after the mechanisms like 
adaptive preference formation have been eliminated – made the account circular. 
 The account of autonomy and independence developed in the previous two sections 
allows us a charitable modification of Elster’s theory. Let us understand autonomy, as I have 
suggested, as consisting in an agent deciding for herself what is valuable, and living her life in 
accordance with that decision. This means that anything which violates the Independence 
Condition undermines autonomy, and (so long as we think autonomy valuable) is bad for that 
reason. Adaptive preference formation, however, is a paradigm case in which the explanation for 
our preferences is covert. The fox explains his preference by saying that the grapes are sour – but 
we know better, and explain it by referring to his unconscious downgrading of the inaccessible 
option. That explanation is covert, for the fox couldn’t be aware of it and it still be the right 
explanation of his preference change. For one thing, it would no longer be unconscious. More 
importantly, even if we don’t want to take adaptive preference formation to unconscious by 
definition, the fox could not explain his preferences on the basis of a belief that the grapes are 
sour if he is aware that their inaccessibility is the only reason he has that belief. 
 So, supplementing Elster’s account of adaptive preference formation solves the first 
problem, by giving a clear reason why adaptive preference formation is bad. 
 The conception of autonomy I have laid out also gives us a principled distinction 
between character planning and adaptive preference formation. Both are ways of dealing with ‘a 
state of tension between what you can do and what you might like to do’.33 However, they differ 
in that the preferences we end up with admit of different explanations. As Elster describes it, 
character planning is never covert: it is always a conscious procedure of ‘trying to shape one’s 
wants so as to coincide exactly with – or differ optimally from – one’s possibilities’.34 Adaptive 
preference formation, by contrast, always is. This is a clean distinction – and it also shows why 
Elster is right that character planning is not problematic for the same reasons as adaptive 
                                                           
33 Elster, Sour Grapes,  p. 117. 
34 Elster, Sour Grapes, p. 118. Interestingly, the means of character planning employed might be covert, even if the 
crucially significant decision to engage in the process is not. So, for example, if I fail at overt character planning, I 
might decide to put myself in the hands of someone who is a master at covert preference change, in the hopes that 
their covert techniques might be successful. My thanks to an anonymous referee for the example. 
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preference formation, despite the structural features that the two phenomena share. So long as 
the Endorsement Condition is satisfied – that is, so long as one has the disposition on reflection 
favourably to assess the character ideal in light of which the planning takes place – then character 
planning can be actively supportive of an individual’s autonomy, though it need not be.35 
 This proposal for drawing the distinction between adaptive preference formation and 
character planning is coextensive with none of Elster’s three attempts, as catalogued in §3 above. 
However, it does also show that there was a grain of truth in each attempt.  
Proposal A was that adaptive preference formation is distinctive because it is a purely 
causal process. My proposal is orthogonal to this. A covert explanation for a preference is not 
ipso facto a causal explanation, nor is a non-covert explanation ipso facto non-causal. Whether or 
not we think there can be non-casual covert explanations or non-covert causal ones will depend 
on our conclusions in other bits of philosophy, but for present purposes we need only observe 
that the question is irrelevant to distinguishing adaptive preferences and character planning.  
Elster might, of course, say that he was using the term ‘causal’ more loosely than I have 
given him credit for, and that what he meant was just that adaptive preference formation is a 
process whereby an agent’s preferences can be explained without referring to the explanation 
which they themselves would be inclined to give of their action – it eliminates the important 
first-person authority which I referred to in §5. If something like that is what Elster meant, then 
he was getting towards the truth – but then he has reason to accept my conception of autonomy 
and the account of the distinction which flows from it, as the most coherent way of paying heed 
to the intuition he was trying to capture. 
Proposal B was that the distinction is between an unconscious process (adaptive 
preference formation) and a conscious one (character planning). My proposal differs from this, 
for although covert influence must be unconscious, unconscious processes need not be covert. 
So, Proposal B draws the line in the wrong place, and incorrectly counts some innocent 
processes of preference formation as adaptive. 
Once again, though, Elster was correct to identify as crucial the idea that adaptive 
preference formation is unconscious. My proposed distinction could therefore just be read as 
making this intuitive idea sharper by stating explicitly that the problem with adaptive preference 
formation is that it has to be unconscious, not merely that it happens to be so. 
Proposal C was to construe the distinction in light of Dworkin’s account of autonomy – 
character planning consists in lower-order preferences being shaped by higher-order ones, and 
adaptive preference formation consists in them being shaped by ‘drives’. My proposed 
distinction is orthogonal to this too. There might instances of higher-order shaping of 
preferences which nevertheless count as adaptive preference formation on my view because the 
higher-order preferences might themselves be ones which have covert explanations. And there 
need be nothing covert about the process whereby a strong first-order desire affects other first-
order preferences: the example I gave in §3C of someone who (mindful that she is perpetually 
and powerfully hungry) consciously cultivates preferences for cheap victuals seems to be an 
                                                           
35 For instructive discussion of this, see Zimmerman (‘Making do’: 35-7, and ‘Sour grapes’: 225-26), who worries 
that on Elster's view we can't distinguish character planning from the much more troubling phenomenon of self-
abnegation, whereby an agent consciously seeks to eliminate desires that lead to unhappiness due to dramatically 
curtailed option-sets. 
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uncontroversial case of character planning.36 So, appealing to Dworkin’s conception of 
autonomy leads to Proposal C identifying the wrong distinction.  
Elster’s basic tactic is sound, though. If I am right, the distinction between the 
phenomena does indeed piggyback on an account of autonomy. Given my criticisms of 
Dworkin’s view in §3C are persuasive, someone who wants to make use of an ideal of autonomy 
has reason to shift to my conception – and these reasons are internal to a concern for autonomy, 
irrespective of my position’s ability to solve Elster’s two problems. So, Elster himself could 
modify his account of adaptive preference formation along the lines I’ve suggested, without 
being vulnerable to the charge of ad hoc squirming.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I started this paper by setting out a pair of problems with Jon Elster’s influential account of 
adaptive preference formation: he gives neither a reason to think the phenomenon a bad thing, 
nor a clear and principled way of distinguishing it from the less malign process of character 
formation. In both cases, the problem turned out to be with Elster’s conception of autonomy – 
either because he gave only a circular and therefore unilluminating definition of the ideal, or 
because he relied on a conception of autonomy (namely Gerald Dworkin’s) which could not do 
the work he needed it to do. My proposal has been that we explicitly define autonomy as 
consisting in an agent deciding for herself what is valuable, and living her life in accordance with 
that decision. An important threat to autonomy, so conceived, is loss of independence – that is, a 
diminution of the extent to which we can say that an agent decides for herself. I suggested that 
this happens when she is covertly influenced – that is, when the explanations for her 
commitments are necessarily hidden from her. Adopting this view is attractive on its own merits. 
And, when coupled to Elster’s account, it solves the two problems mentioned above. Adaptive 
preference formation is bad because it is always covert, whereas character formation is always 
non-covert. 
 In case I be thought guilty of painting an altogether too rosy picture, I conclude a caveat. 
My proposed rescue for Elster only works if my conception of autonomy is defensible, and I 
have offered only small and indirect argument for that claim in this paper. So, accepting my 
proposal is not costless. Someone who insists on understanding autonomy some other way – in 
Dworkin’s sense, for example, or perhaps as a more overtly Kantian conception of self-
legislation – will not find my account persuasive. Neither will someone who thinks that 
autonomy is not in fact an important ideal.  
These possible sources of disagreement should not worry us too much, though. I have 
already said something to the first critic, by commenting on some reasons to think that other 
conceptions of autonomy are problematic. And the second critic seems to bear a burden of 
proof, in that she must show why – if we don’t really care about autonomy at all – we should 
think adaptive preference formation problematic in the first place.37 
                                                           
36 Of course, we might think there’s still something wrong with her situation, from the point of view of autonomy or 
otherwise. 
37 My thanks to Harry Adamson, Daniel Elstein, Lorna Finlayson, Hallvard Lillehammer and Serena Olsaretti for 
discussion on arguments in this paper. 
